. Quality, relation, and the dichotomy between physical and mental world.
as it happened in the case of qualities, relations were historically removed from the physical world as a result of the modern view suggested by Galilean science.
The picture is made more difficult by the ambiguous relation between the qualitative and the relational aspects of the mind. Some authors argued that phenomenal states can be reduced either to their representational or to their intentional content (for instance, Tye 1990). Although it is unclear whether there could be non-intentional representation, in many fields such as computer science, representations are often conceived independently of any intentional commitment. Symmetrically, it has been argued that thoughts have a specific qualitative content (Strawson 1994; Chalmers 1996; Strawson 2003b) . On the other hand many scholars keep maintaining either that there are purely qualitative phenomenal contents (qualia) or that there are purely intentional, viz. relational, mental contents or both (Block 1980; Shoemaker 1990; Block 1995; Chalmers 1996) .
And yet, is the physical world really non-relational and quality free? I will argue that we should not necessarily answer positively to this question. This paper is principally an attempt to argue that the physical world is relational. Furthermore, I will argue that being relational and being qualitative is one and the same. If this were tenable, the traditional gap between subjective and objective aspects could be closed. The suggested process ontology endorses a panpsychistic view of reality -a neutral monist approach in which processes can be described either under the objective quantitative perspective or under the subjective qualitative perspective. That is, I will advocate here a kind of neutral monism grounded on processes not so dissimilar in aim to William James' doctrine of pure experience. Although panpsychism has often been misrepresented and a priori rejected, many authors have recently reconsidered it (Chalmers 1996; Griffin 1998; Skrbina 2005; Strawson 2006) .
In the first section I will sketch out the historical and theoretical reasons that led to the present separation between the physical world and the qualitative and relational aspects. In Section 2, I will address in more details the drawbacks of a non-relational world and I will try to show how such a world disagrees with empirical data. In Section 3, I will suggest that the physical world (as we experience it) is made of objects which are complex relational wholes. In this respect, objects are processes taking place in time. In the fourth section I will outline some more details about the kind of process ontology that can be used to deal with the physical world and with the mental world. Finally, in the last section, I will maintain that a process view of reality endorses panpsychism since it suggests that both relation and qualities are located in the world and not only in the body, or brains, of subjects.
. Unsnarling a complex knot: Is the physical world non-relational and devoid of qualities?
We are all victims of Galileo's divide. The layman -and often the scientist tooassumes that the physical world is devoid of any formal and qualitative properties. This is rather surprising since our experience of the world is full of qualities: color, smells, shapes, tastes, sounds, and so forth. Our experience of the world is not made of numbers, geometrical relations, or physical quantities but rather of fleshy chunks of experience, each constituted by a specific quality. What is the nexus between qualities and the physical world? Traditionally, the hypothesis of a world without qualities entails the location of qualities inside the subject: if qualities are not in the world, they must be elsewhere.
Similarly, the physical world is commonly conceived as non-relational. A stone is a stone and is self-sufficient. It can be defined as an individual with certain properties instantiated at a certain time. A stone, or a voltage level inside a transistor, or a mark on a chalkboard would not refer to anything but themselves if it were not for the intentional capabilities of subjects. The intentionality of physical phenomena is conceived as derivate from the original intentionality of subjects (Searle 1980 (Searle , 1992 . Once again relations, like qualities, have been pushed inside the subject.
The matter is made even more complex because many assumptions lurk in the background. Since these assumptions usually have a twofold structure, I present them as pairs of clauses:
Pair #1: * The physical world is non-relational.
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Of course, there is no space to fully address each of these issues. Some important points can be mentioned, though. It is important to stress that these pairs of clauses by no means precisely and exhaustively partition the relevant conceptual space. They overlap and partially contradict themselves. Further P1, P2, and P5 are ontological claims while P3 and P4 are epistemic ones.
The physical world is non-relational. The first pair P1 addresses the belief in a physical world made of autonomous and self-contained entities. It is a development of atomism. It is the view that Whitehead (1938) epitomized as "the grand doctrine of nature as a self-sufficient meaningless complex of facts." It is important to stress that such a view does not correspond to recent development in physics (Jammer 1954 (Jammer /1993 Cramer 1988) neither in the macrophysical nor in the microphysical realm. The view matches with Brentano's claim that mental entities are intentional and in relation with their objects. The two claims conspired to keep separate the mental and the physical domain. For instance, Jerry Fodor repeatedly despaired that no physical entity can refer to anything else in the physical world (Fodor 1976 (Fodor , 1998 . Many authors accepted this assumption and thus tried unsuccessfully to naturalize intentionality; that is, to reduce intentionality to something that is non-relational at all (Millikan 1984; Dennett 1987 Dennett , 1991 Dretske 1995) .
The physical world is not qualitative. The second pair P2 refers to the assumption that the physical world does not possess any quality and that qualities emerge out of the subject. Historically, the fatal step was the location of qualities inside the subject, a step carried out by Galileo:
I am inclined to think that these tastes, smells, colors, etc., with regard to the object in which they appear to reside, are nothing more than mere names, and exist only in the sensitive body; when the living creature is removed all these qualities are carried off and annihilated. (The Assayer, 1623) The "sensitive body" -namely, Galileo's version of the subject -became the natural locus of qualities. Because of their location, these qualities were subsequently called phenomenal or subjective qualities. As a result, it was possible to postpone the understanding of many troublesome aspects of reality, such as relations and qualities. For a while, the physical world became a neat and relatively well-defined place. Subsequent scholars started to look for the exact locus of phenomenal experience. Initially, peripheral nerves were proposed. According to Jonathan Muller's law of specific energies each nerve was capable of assigning a specific quality to its signals. Although the idea was quickly set aside, contemporary neuroscientists continue to look either for a cortical area or finer neural structures with the same capacity -namely, the neural correlates of experience. 1 So far, the quest has been fruitless.
It has been objected that the research is only at its beginning, and that we must wait for future breakthroughs. Yet, whoever makes this objection overlooks an important distinction. There is a practical difficulty in observing the activity of thousands and billions of neurons in vivo; I shall call it a technical impossibility. In addition there is an ontological impossibility of observing a quality. If the very starting hypotheses rules out the existence of qualities in the physical world, why should they make their appearance inside a neuronal network which, as complex as it is, is still a part of the physical world? It is remarkable that the very assumptions on which most of current neuroscience is based rule out the possibility of achieving any result. No matter how much correlation is recorded between neural activities and verbal reports, no observation of a quality is to be expected under these assumptions. What is usually called a Neural Correlate of Consciousness ought to be called a Neural Correlate of Verbal Reports.
On the other hand, once we accept that experiences are a fact (and most neuroscientists do), there is no reason why such qualities should not be a part of nature in general. When these qualities are part of that subset of reality -which corresponds to us -we refer to them as experiences. Yet most scholars are restrained from embracing this view since they are afraid of putting qualities back into the physical world, because of the 'mortal danger' of panpsychism or panexperientialism.
Epistemic accessibility of qualities. The third pair P3 is a rather Kantian set of claims.
It suggests that the physical properties of the world are beyond the grasp of our senses and that our experience is something utterly different from the real world: "we realize that science has nothing to say as to the intrinsic nature of the atom" (Eddington 1928) .
From an epistemic point of view, mental phenomenon and physical noumenon seem doomed to never meet. On the other hand, subjects are expected to have a Cartesian direct access to their mental states. This view is particularly valued among neuroscientists who maintain that experience is independent of the surrounding environment. For instance, Giulio Tononi has stated that "consciousness depends exclusively on the ability of a system to integrate information, whether or not it. . .is immersed in the environment " (2004: 20) .
Qualities are absolute and knowledge is relative. P4 states that qualities are absolute and ontologically unrelated with the world -that is, they do not depend on their intentional or representational content. I labeled the first clause the qualia thesis since qualia are held to be phenomenal content independent of what they are related to. Here absolute is used in its original etymological meaning which comes from ab+solutum, that is, to be free from any relation. As to the qualities of qualia or subjective experience, many people rest on the view originally expressed by John Locke:
Blue and yellow, bitter or sweet, can never be false ideas: these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are, and are intended to be. (1689, II, 32, 16) Allegedly, when I have a quale of red, its content ought to be independent of the physical phenomena triggering it -although usually the same quale is triggered by the same physical phenomenon. Most qualia-related paradoxes are due to such lack of relational nature (Shoemaker 1982; Dennett 1988; Chalmers 1996) . The lack of relationality is also the main reason for their causal evanescence (Jackson 1982; Horgan 1984; Kim 1998 (1958: 37) It interesting to observe that, from an epistemic perspective, P4 is the opposite of P1 from an ontological point of view.
Qualities and relation are inside the subject. Finally, P5 maintains that there must be an ontological difference mirroring the epistemic divide. The place where experience takes place must possess some special ontological status. This is of course a strong anti-panpsychist stance, based mostly on the so-called commonsensical belief that our experience of the world is concocted inside our body. 2 This view is often labeled internalism since it assumes that experience is related with physical phenomena internal to our body. It states that our consciousness is identical to (or correlated to) the processes, events or states of affairs going on inside the boundary of our body (or brain). According to this view, "The goal is to discover the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific conscious percept." (Koch 2004: 16) . Up to now, no convincing empirical results have been presented, notwithstanding the impressive amount of resources invested in finding Neural Correlates of Consciousness (Metzinger 2000; Rees, Kreiman et al. 2002; Koch 2004) . The obvious corollary of this clause is that the physical world without brains (and, for some, bodies) ought to be devoid of (phenomenal) qualities. On the other hand, many authors, like myself, have questioned the internalist view. These partially overlapping and partially contradictory twofold assumptions constitute the implicit background from which most of the research on consciousness is carried out, in psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. I do not claim to have analyzed them completely. They simply outline the gist of current scientific research. This is precisely the point that Whitehead observed:
When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents fell it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know that they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch.
(1925: 48)
. The illusion of a non-relational physical world
In the previous section, I sketched those assumptions that triggered the invention of a non-relational and quality-free physical world. Physicists got rid of the problem of explaining not reality as such, but rather reality modulo a set of essential features that were located inside the subject (whatever the subject was). This epistemic strategy was extremely successful, although it induced many to accept assumptions that oversimplified the problem of the nature of the world. Epistemic success transfigured itself into ontological orthodoxy. But, for once, epistemic efficacy must not be mistaken for ontological truth. Sometimes it is assumed that relations in the physical world and intentionality belong to two different domains. Yet if we ever want to provide a unified picture of world and mind, it is paramount to ground both aspects in a common foundation. So it should not be surprising that I will start my analysis of relations from the physical world.
In science, the removal of the intrinsic relational nature of many phenomena suggested the self-consistency of many entities: mass, absolute space, the living organism, the cell, the genetic code, information, the conscious mind. In time, such selfconsistency was strongly questioned (Jammer 1954 (Jammer /1993 Oyama 1985 Oyama /2000 Bickhard 2001) , and in many cases rejected. For instance, according to Mach's principle, the inertial mass of an object depends on the relation with all the other masses of the universe. Absolute space got a relational twist due to Einstein's theory of relativity. The living organism cannot be conceived and understood without its ecological setting. The cell would not exist outside of an interconnected chain of interactions and inside the proper ecological niche. The genetic code has no intrinsic meaning and is tightly coupled with the cellular body. Information has no autonomous existence, it depends on the interactions between a source and a receiver -whatever they are. Finally it is questionable whether the conscious mind could be conceived in isolation, or rather if it is a way to refer to a network of causal interactions with the environment.
Another well known example of the importance of relations for developing explanations of physical phenomena is the science of complexity. At the beginning of systems theory, it was maintained that systems could be studied in relative isolation; a claim that proved to be fatally wrong. To deal with real systems, scholars started to develop techniques to deal with complexity in practically all fields, from engineering to weather forecasting.
In short, the invention of a non-relational physical world suggested that the world is made of self-sufficient individuals with their properties. It is a very simple ontological framework which had been embraced as well by most analytical philosophers (Strawson 1959; Armstrong 1989) . The illusion of a non-relational physical world was extremely attractive since it allowed the study of several phenomena in isolation. Unfortunately, such an attractive framework does not seem to fit with empirical experience.
Whitehead (1938) wrote at length against such a commonsensical view of the world as made of "bits" which are "enduring self-identically". Each such bit "occupies a definite limited region" and possesses its own set of intrinsic properties such as "its mass, its color" and the "essential relationship between bits of matter is purely spatial".
Contemporary science stresses the interconnected nature of most, if not all, physical phenomena. It is ironic that the non-relational view of the physical world, now mostly out of date, still survives with respect to experiential qualities.
The absolute view of qualities is once more a result of their placement inside the subject -whatever the subject is. If subjective experiences were instantiated inside the subject, they would be absolute and non-relational. The non-relational view of the physical world ended by entailing a non-relational view of the mental world, too. As is shown in Figure 2 (a, b, and c), qualities and relations were squeezed out of a physical world that, being non-relational, could not foster them. Unfortunately this divide et impera way of partitioning reality suggested splitting the relational and the qualitative aspect of experience, too. In Figure 2 (bottom), there is the final conceptual result: all aspects of reality (relations, qualities, physical occurrences) lay in separate conceptual slots, with no hope of reunion.
As subjects, we are well aware that our own experiences are tightly coupled with the causal flow of physical events. At the same time, and contra Galileo, we have a strong pretheoretical intuition that qualities are not a pure mental outcome. Somehow, the green we see is related with the properties of the grass out there, as well as the deep humming produced by an audio subwoofer is related with the nature of air pressure. Phenomenal experiences have causal consequences and causal antecedents. We are in relation with the world, and the world seems somehow continuous with our being. How do we reconcile such empirical and experiential intuitions with the traditional framework that segregates relations, qualities, and physical occurrences into watertight theoretical slots?
U n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f s - J o h n B e n j a m i n s P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y Intentional content n o t r e l a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a l Atoms and objects It is fair to suspect that the neat but hopeless conceptual landscape of Figure 2 (bottom) is the unwanted result of oversimplifying hypotheses about the fundamental structure of reality. In order to overcome the present limitations it is worthwhile to take into consideration a new conception of the physical world, one in which qualities are not located inside the subject but rather belong to the physical world in general.
. The relational nature of the physical world
In recent years, several authors have pointed out the relational nature of many phenomenal experiences, as well as the relational nature of many physical phenomena. By 'relational nature' I mean the fact that a phenomenon cannot take place in isolation but is always the result of an interaction between separate phenomena. A paradigmatic example of a relational physical phenomenon is offered by the rainbow (Manzotti 2006a), which can neither occur nor be conceived without an observer. However, as mentioned before, the physical world is often conceived as selfsufficient. This is particularly true for the commonsensical picture of the physical world used in everyday life. The world of our experience is a world of macrophysical events made of objects like chairs, tables, walls, buildings, hills, and planets. They seem to be what they are, independent of both their surrounding environment and of subjects.
Furthermore, we are not directly aware of the fundamental properties of the physical world. We have no experience of electricity, gravity, photons as such but rather of much greater entities. We are aware of objects, reflectance curves, and complex relational properties (like an affordance or a sensory motor contingency).
5 I am aware of a chair, a face, a certain shade of color which is a complex whole, resulting from several physical conditions. This is the reality I experience. The reality with which I come in contact is not made of primary qualities but rather of complex wholes.
Does this macroscopical reality exist autonomously? Or is it rather a reality that has a relational nature? Here, I argue for the latter option. The target of my argument is the macroscopical object. I will argue that an object does not exist autonomously but requires some relation with a proper physical system. I am confident that the same argument could well be applied to other sensory cases, like colors, smells, tactile patterns, and flavors.
The notion of 'object' is strongly related with that of 'whole.' An object is a whole made of several parts: surfaces, three dimensional parts, or even atoms. A macroscopic object is definitely not atomic in the etymological sense ('atom' means indivisible).
Consider the classic Dalmatian dog of Gestalt psychology. Is it a whole, or rather a scattered sum of black patches? Consider a face. Is it a whole, or rather a juxtaposition of facial features? Consider a chair. It is made of four legs and a few flattened surfaces. Is it a whole, or just a sum of scattered patterns? Consider the seven stars in the sky that compose the Ursa Maior. What is the Ursa Major constellation? Is it a whole, or is it a set of separate physical phenomena?
For the sake of simplicity, by the word 'whole' I refer to what has elsewhere been called -albeit with slightly different meanings -'integral whole' , 'mereological sum' , 'natural unit' , or 'fusion' (Simons 1987a; Nolan 2006) . I refer to a scattered collection of elements as an 'arbitrary sum' . An object is a whole.
I argue that in order to have a meaningful notion of whole, and thus of object, we need to introduce a relational and temporal aspect.
Assuming a non-relation standpoint, and given n elements (or initial entities of any aforementioned kind) how many wholes are there? if any? There are three possible answers. First, the principle of Unrestricted Composition holds that for any group of elements, there is a whole that they constitute (Lewis 1986; Bigelow & Pargetter 2006) . Succinctly, it states that "whenever two things exist, then there is also a third thing that contains those two as parts" (Bigelow & Pargetter 2006: 486) . Such a view admits the largest possible number of wholes (for n parts, it accepts 2 n -1 wholes). The second option -sometimes referred to as Restricted Composition -limits the total number of wholes. It is an option closer to our everyday experience. Unfortunately, as we will see, up to now it has been an ambiguous and vague option. Unrestricted composition seems to disagree with commonsense (and it certainly goes well beyond it) while it allows that there is a whole object whenever commonsense says there is, it says that there are wholes where commonsense does not (there is an object which is my left ear plus the Alpha Centauri system, and it does not include intervening objects in the intervening space, or elsewhere). (2006: 717) It seems fairly agreeable that, according to most versions of Restricted Composition, a whole made of Nolan's left ear plus the Alpha Centauri system is not really a whole. There are collections of things that do not seem to constitute a real whole. Are they a whole? Hardly. And, yet, why not? So far, Restricted Composition has not offered a substantial alternative.
The criterion "hanging together when pushed" does not hold for many otherwise acceptable wholes. There are wholes that span time, like an uttered word or a sound. A series of sound waves, constituting an uttered word, could well be a whole, without being made of things hanging together. Peter Simons (1987b: 291) stressed the absence of a working criterion: "How a number, a sigh, a poem, a person, a galaxy, and a thunderstorm could comprise and exhaust a single individual seems beyond understanding."
A possible solution is to consider a whole as a relational entity and, thus, objects as relational entities. What kind of relation are they? Consider a simple causal relation. An object does exist if it is engaged in a causal process. According to this view something does exist if and only if is the cause of something as a whole. Consider two propositions. If this were the case, there should be an A* that exists and that does not produce effects. This looks less problematic than the previous case; yet only apparently. It is impossible to measure or observe something like A*. To be measured or observed A* must produce a distinguishable effect on some instrument of measure. Light is observable since it produces effects on the cones and rods of our retina or other suitable physical apparatuses. Mass is measurable since it curves space and thus it exerts a force. By hypothesis we assumed that A* does not produce any effect whatsoever. Thus, whether A* exists or not is not an empirical or scientific fact, since it cannot be the object of any observation. Furthermore, from a broader point of view, the existence of A* cannot make any difference for anything else in the universe. In fact, A* is out of our universe, for all practical (and non-practical) purposes. Another way to put the matter is the following. There is no difference between the existence and the absence of something like A*. Again, it is nomologically absurd that [a] and [b] are not coextensive.
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Then we are left with the fact that whenever [a] is true, [b] must be true, and vice versa. If this holds, then 'existing' and 'producing effects' are coextensive. This is quite important because it means that existence is always embedded in a causal relation spanning time and space -something I will build upon in what follows.
Grounding the notion of existence on that of causation could seem rather hazardous, but there can be no other viable solution. I rest on Davidson's view of causation:
The inevitable comment (since the time of Mill anyway) is that the striking [of the match] may have been part of the cause, but it was hardly sufficient for the lighting since it was also necessary for the match to be dry, that there be enough oxygen, etc. This comment is, in my opinion, confused. For since this match was dry, and was struck in enough oxygen, etc., the striking of this match was identical with the striking of a dry match in enough oxygen. How can one and the same event both be, and not be, sufficient for the lighting? In fact, it is not events that are necessary or sufficient as causes, but events as described in one way or another. (1969/1980: 172) Chapter 10. Process externalism  Kanisza's triangle possible wholes In short, I do not rest my argument on a type-notion of causation but on actual causal occurrences. The idea that existing is coextensive with producing effects can be fruitfully applied to many problems (Manzotti 2006a (Manzotti , 2006b . Consider the figure known as Kanisza's triangle (Figure 4 , on the left). In that figure, there are three black round shapes with a missing wedge. Consider each of these shapes as an atomic object. The question is, here as above, how many objects are there in the picture? A possible answer is 'three' (No Composition). Another answer is 'four' -the three shapes plus the whole made of all of them (a case of Restricted Composition). A further possible answer is 'seven' -the three shapes plus the whole made of all of them plus three bi-shapes made of two shapes each (Unrestricted Composition).
Since No Composition does not satisfy our pre-theoretic intuition about reality, Unrestricted Composition inflates the number up to seven, which seems too much. Whereas the former approach turns down every whole, the latter considers every possible combination as real. Unrestricted Composition appears to be too prodigal. The total number of possible wholes is definitely much larger than those that are actually taking place. A number of 100 parts would be enough to produce 1.2×10 30 potential wholes (see Figure 3) . As I mentioned above, neither Unrestricted Composition nor No Composition satisfy our pre-theoretical intuitions. The most common answers would have been 'one' , 'three' or 'four' . These answers correspond to the intuition that there are some combinations that are real wholes while there are other combinations that are not. How to distinguish between them? The whole made of three shapes looks more real than the three intermediate wholes made of two shapes each. This is a phenomenon with a very well-known perceptual explanation. But here we are interested whether there is any ontological difference. Look at Figure 4 : What makes g) a whole more 'substantial' than d), e), or f)?
I suggest that the difference is an actual occurrence of a causal relation that makes g) ontologically a real whole instead of an arbitrary sum. On the basis of the causally related view of existence outlined above, a whole is not something that exists, rather it is something that takes place. The only way to take place is to produce effects. In other words, a whole does exist insofar as it produces an effect.
The threshold between possible wholes and real ones corresponds to the difference between those actually producing effects and those not.
In Figure 4 , I draw explicitly the seven different "potential" wholes made of three blobs. Such a sketch is misleading since they are only potential wholes represented in a timeless domain. On the contrary, in Figure 5 , I tried to represent explicitly the temporal dimension of these wholes. They do exist since they produce effects.
In Figure 5a , the three blobs are represented at t=0. Is anything going to happen because of them? If nothing is going to happen because of the three blobs, I claim that they do not exist.
For the sake of the argument, consider the three blobs in a toy universe. In such a universe there is only one other entity. This other entity, whose nature we are not concerned with, is capable of interacting with a single blob at a time. The entity acts as a context that let a blob at a time to produce an effect. An example of context is an environment with enough oxygen, a given air pressure, a certain level of humidity, etc. Other examples are neural structures, locks, or any physical system capable of reacting to other physical events.
In such a universe, the only possible occurrence is produced by a two-way interaction between one of the blobs and the other entity. In such a universe, only single blobs exist. This is a universe corresponding to No Composition and is represented in Figure 5b .
Let us modify the toy universe. This time, there is only one other entity, different from the previous one and capable of interacting with three blobs at a time. One or two are not enough to trigger the interaction. Three are needed. In this universe, only the whole of the three units exist -single blobs do not exist. This universe is represented in Figure 5c .
Finally let us introduce two entities: one capable of interacting with a single blob, and another capable of interacting with three blobs together. In this universe, the most similar to our own, there are four entities -the three blobs and the whole made of three blobs. This is a universe satisfying a version of Restricted Composition; viz. a casually grounded version.
Building on the previous considerations, I suggest a definition of a whole which can be used to endorse macroscopic objects. A whole is any collection either of events or their relations or both, such that they are the cause of a joint effect. 
Figure 5. The relation between wholes and parts can be approached in a temporal domain where a whole corresponds to a causal relation taking place in time.
The proposed definition can be used to get a better picture of what an object is. An object is a part of reality that interacts as a whole with other portions of reality. Usually the latter role is played by subjects but it is not mandatory.
According to this view, a table is an object because it can usefully interact with human beings in order to let them lay down other objects on a flat surface which lies off the ground. The Dalmatian picture is a dog since our perceptual and cognitive system allows it to take place in a certain way. Other kinds of observers would not see the whole, and thus the scattered sum of black patches would not become a whole. Faces are objects because they are continuously amidst subjects capable of recognizing them. Finally, the Ursa Major constellation becomes an object in its own right, because at the end of a long journey the light rays emitted by its seven stars meet a human eye linked with the proper brain.
A question could spontaneously arise: Were there any objects in the universe 10 million years ago? 1 billion years ago? What level of 'observer' is required to unify phenomena into a whole, and hence into an object? I suggest that the perception of an object is identical with the taking place of that object. For instance, is it meaningful to conceive written characters without subjects capable of recognizing them? Are there pattern without observers? An observer is here conceived not as an epistemic agent choosing a favored interpretation. The observer of x is any physical system that would allow x to take place and produce effects as a unified entity. X could be made of any complex set of physical phenomena whose existence does not depend on the existence of the observer of x. The observer of x would not exist without x and, symmetrically, x would not exist without the observer. I suggest a twofold view. First, observing/representing something is being in relation with that something. Second, being in relation with something means to be identical with that something by means of a process in which two aspects of reality -traditionally conceived as separate -are embodied by the same process.
Consider a closely-aligned binary star system somewhere in the universe, and a planet orbiting the pair at a distance. Does the planet unify the pair of stars into one object? In fact it does -however it is a very poor observer since the only phenomena which are unified are the stars' masses, momentum, speed, and position. A human astronaut, orbiting in the same way, would probably unify many more aspects: shape, colors, textures, patterns on the surface, and many others. The human observer and the planet are both observer of the pair of stars, but they are observing and unifying different physical phenomena. Thus, they are observers of different objects. For instance, there is a process that begins with a nice color combination of the two stars and ends in the astronaut visual cortex. Without the astronaut, such process would not take place. The planet would be unable to make it happens. The center of gravity, incidentally, is just a mathematical simplification. There is no such a thing as the center of gravity. Bodies behave as if they were attracted by a center of gravity. But the center of gravity is just a conceptual shortcut to make computations easier.
A long respected tradition assumed that objects must exist independently of any interaction with the surrounding environment. Unfortunately, this is an unjustified oversimplification.
. A process ontology to endorse a relational view of the physical world
If an object is something that takes place because of a causal relation between a set of events and a proper context, an object has an intrinsic temporal nature, since all causal relations have a temporal nature -most likely due to the spatio-temporal fabric of our universe.
The problem of the nature of the physical world shifts from a timeless perspective to a temporally-oriented view. An object corresponds to a causal relation in time and space. Hence, objects are not entities definable in any a priori way. Rather, they correspond to the way in which events are causally connected. An interesting consequence of the suggested view is the fact that if there were no time, there would be no objects. Let me sketch a few consequences.
First, imagine that it were possible to freeze time. According to common opinion, if time were halted everything would remain frozen, as in a snapshot. Raindrops and snowflakes would remain still in the air. Cars and bystanders would stay motionless. But think some more. In such a timeless instant, there would be no sounds since sounds require time. There would be no neural activity since neural activity is imple-mented by means of chemical sequences spanning time. There would be no light since light rays travel in time. Finally there would be no objects since every object requires time to take place -at least, according to the approach I presented here.
Secondly, different objects have different temporal durations. For instance, in order to take place a face needs the time required for light to go from one person to another, plus the time required to the neural machinery of the beholder to allow the face to take place as a whole. Each object has its own specific time equal to the time demanded by the corresponding causal relation. Thus, given a certain temporal window, certain objects are excluded.
Third, reality is thus made of objects taking place with different temporal lengths. At the same time there are objects very short and objects much longer. An interesting example is offered by the human perceptual system where different perceptual objects, corresponding to many different collections of events in the environment, produce effects in different instants. 6 For instance, movement takes more time than color to produce an effect in the brain. A bright spot would produce a very fast response while a face would take a longer time. So there are fast objects and slow ones.
Fourth, since objects do not exist but rather take place, objects are temporally located. A persisting object needs to be continuously rehearsed.
Fifth, objects are locatable. There could be either objects whose elements are already scattered in time (like a piece of music made of sounds that are scattered in time) or objects whose elements take place at the same time (like the black spots on a piece of paper constituting Kanisza's triangle). In both cases, the causal relation and thus the event that 'completes' the objects must take place, at least, a little after the last event of the collection.
When does an object take place? If an object is a causal relation spanning from its elements to the joint effect, when is the whole located in time? At a minimum, there must be one first event (or a sub-collection of events if they are synchronous) at one end of the causal relation, and the effect at the other end. The interval of time is finite. When does the object take place? The object cannot be considered complete until the final effect has taken place. There is not one temporal instant where the object is condensed. The object corresponds to the whole causal relation smeared in time and space.
However something could go wrong along the way. The object does not take place unless and until the final joint effect does take place. Metaphorically speaking, it is like getting a degree. Assume that you passed all exams and prepared and printed your thesis. Yet, because of some unexpected event, on the very last day you miss the defence. You cannot say that you took a degree. Although the underlying relevant phenomena are practically the same (studying, passing exams, writing your final dissertation), you 'get a degree' only after the dissertation, which is the final effect. In some sense, the occurrence of an object is only potential until it actually produces an effect. However, not until it does produce an effect -and only then -does the object take place from its very beginning.
In other words, an object does not 'occur' until a final joint effect happens -incomplete objects have no degree of existence. 'Objectness' does not exist on a sliding scale -say, from lower intensity to higher intensity. Although it could seem counterintuitive, I defend an on/off view of objects: something like the series: 0 -0 -0 -0 -object! After all this is exactly what happens when we look at something, and, all of a sudden, something snaps and we are aware of that something. Neurons work this way, too. They fire when their inputs reached a certain threshold. I try to avoid reference to any kind of fuzzy or potential entities -either something takes place or it doesn't.
There are two possible views of the physical world: one is made of the familiar gravitational, electromagnetic, weak and strong nuclear fields of physics; the other is made of the familiar macroscopic objects with their familiar properties. Here I claim that the latter has a relational nature and that it cannot be defined without recourse to interaction with human beings or similarly structured systems.
A question could arise about what a 'similarly structured system' ought to be. A conscious being such as a human is capable of being in relation with hundreds of thousands of separate and distinguishable very complex events (for instance, with colors or forms). Thus her mind is extended to a very large cloud of causal processes of the kind described. A similarly structured system (a future intelligent machine, a chimpanzee) allows a comparable set of processes. More limited systems (an insect, a cell, a bacterium, a domino tile) allow smaller sets of simpler processes, but there is not any difference in the process themselves apart from the fact that they carve out a simpler aspect of reality. The quality does not emerge out of the complexity of the system -the quality is a way to refer to the nature of each process.
An analogy: A cloud is a lot more complex than a single water droplet floating in the air, but the drops in the clouds are identical to a single isolated drop. Yet, a water droplet is not a cloud. When we refer to a conscious mind, we conceive of a cloud of processes comparable to that of a conscious human being. In principle everything can (potentially) do it, to a greater or lesser degree.
If the same process -which is now entangled in the larger set of processes that I call 'my conscious experience hic et nunc' and corresponds to my experience of, say, the red of the characters on the computer screen -would happen elsewhere, isolated from other processes, it would be completely identical to the one which is now in my experience. It would have the same properties, the same features, and the same qualities. However, it would not contribute to a larger set of processes capable of, among other things, discussion about it. The water droplet inside the cloud, if taken out and isolated, remains the same.
If this relational view of the world, based on a process ontology, is tenable, the traditional separation between the relational mind and the non-relational physical world would no longer hold. The world and the mind could share the same relational structure embodied by the same physical processes. Furthermore, as I have argued else-concocts a different phenomenal quality from that concocted by Sabrina's brain. My answer is that I single out a certain relational structure in light reflectances while Sabrina singles out a different relational structure. In both cases, the color we see has not been created inside our brain, but it is a physical process taking place partially inside our body and partially in the environment.
To recap the defended view:
-There is no difference between a pattern/object and the mental representation of that pattern; -The two are incomplete and partial perspectives on the process by which that pattern could take place -the process being identical with the pattern itself; -The pattern would not exist independently of the process; -The pattern does not exist out of the relation/process that allows the pattern to take place; -The observer does not exist out of the relation/process that allows the observer of that pattern to take place.
Thus, everything could unify, and everything could be externalized 'mind' in this sense. Human subjects are just the greater unifiers that we know of. A human brain is what it is because it is the center of a hurricane of a very huge number of unifying processes, and the mind is the part of the universe which is taking place due to them. Hence it should be clear that the view presented here is a kind of externalism grounded in process philosophy -in other words, a process externalism. Qualities and relations are not a product of the internal activity of neural systems; they are processes taking place in the world. It is equally plain that this view endorses a panpsychic stance.
